Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction
暫譯: 行為遊戲理論:戰略互動實驗

Colin F. Camerer

  • 出版商: Princeton University
  • 出版日期: 2003-03-17
  • 售價: $1,650
  • 貴賓價: 9.8$1,617
  • 語言: 英文
  • 頁數: 568
  • 裝訂: Hardcover
  • ISBN: 0691090394
  • ISBN-13: 9780691090399
  • 已絕版

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商品描述

Game theory, the formalized study of strategy, began in the 1940s by asking how emotionless geniuses should play games, but ignored until recently how average people with emotions and limited foresight actually play games. This book marks the first substantial and authoritative effort to close this gap. Colin Camerer, one of the field's leading figures, uses psychological principles and hundreds of experiments to develop mathematical theories of reciprocity, limited strategizing, and learning, which help predict what real people and companies do in strategic situations. Unifying a wealth of information from ongoing studies in strategic behavior, he takes the experimental science of behavioral economics a major step forward. He does so in lucid, friendly prose.

Behavioral game theory has three ingredients that come clearly into focus in this book: mathematical theories of how moral obligation and vengeance affect the way people bargain and trust each other; a theory of how limits in the brain constrain the number of steps of "I think he thinks . . ." reasoning people naturally do; and a theory of how people learn from experience to make better strategic decisions. Strategic interactions that can be explained by behavioral game theory include bargaining, games of bluffing as in sports and poker, strikes, how conventions help coordinate a joint activity, price competition and patent races, and building up reputations for trustworthiness or ruthlessness in business or life.

While there are many books on standard game theory that address the way ideally rational actors operate, Behavioral Game Theory stands alone in blending experimental evidence and psychology in a mathematical theory of normal strategic behavior. It is must reading for anyone who seeks a more complete understanding of strategic thinking, from professional economists to scholars and students of economics, management studies, psychology, political science, anthropology, and biology.

商品描述(中文翻譯)

遊戲理論,作為策略的正式研究,始於1940年代,當時的問題是無情的天才應該如何玩遊戲,但直到最近才開始關注情感豐富且具有限前瞻性的普通人實際上是如何玩遊戲的。本書標誌著首次實質性且權威的努力來填補這一空白。科林·卡梅勒(Colin Camerer),這一領域的領軍人物之一,利用心理學原則和數百個實驗來發展互惠、有限策略和學習的數學理論,這些理論有助於預測真實的人和公司在策略情境中的行為。他將來自持續進行的策略行為研究的豐富資訊統一起來,將行為經濟學的實驗科學向前推進了一大步。他以清晰、友好的文筆進行這一切。

行為遊戲理論在本書中清晰聚焦於三個要素:道德義務和報復如何影響人們的談判和互信的數學理論;大腦的限制如何約束人們自然進行的「我想他想……」推理步驟的理論;以及人們如何從經驗中學習以做出更好的策略決策的理論。行為遊戲理論可以解釋的策略互動包括談判、如體育和撲克中的虛張聲勢遊戲、罷工、慣例如何幫助協調共同活動、價格競爭和專利競賽,以及在商業或生活中建立信任或無情的聲譽。

雖然有許多關於標準遊戲理論的書籍探討理想理性行為者的運作方式,但《行為遊戲理論》獨樹一幟,將實驗證據和心理學融入正常策略行為的數學理論中。對於任何尋求更全面理解策略思維的人來說,無論是專業經濟學家,還是經濟學、管理學、心理學、政治學、人類學和生物學的學者和學生,這本書都是必讀之作。