Strategy : An Introduction to Game Theory (IE-Paperback)
暫譯: 策略：博弈論導論 (IE-平裝本)

Joel Watson

Strategy : An Introduction to Game Theory (IE-Paperback)
  • 出版商: W.W.Norton
  • 出版日期: 2013-01-01
  • 售價: $1,660
  • 貴賓價: 9.8 折 $1,627
  • 語言: 英文
  • 頁數: 491
  • ISBN: 0393920828
  • ISBN-13: 9780393920826

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商品描述

Game theory has become an enormously important field of study. It is now a vital methodology for researchers and teachers in many disciplines, including economics, political science, biology, and law. This book provides a thorough introduction to the subject and its applications, at the intermediate level of instruction. It is designed for the upper-division game theory courses that are offered in most undergraduate economics programs and also serves graduate students in economics, political science, law, and business who seek a solid and readable introduction to the theory. The book can be a primary or secondary source for graduate courses that have a significant game-theoretic component.

商品描述(中文翻譯)

博弈論已成為一個極為重要的研究領域。它現在是許多學科中研究者和教師的重要方法論，包括經濟學、政治學、生物學和法律。本書提供了對該主題及其應用的全面介紹，適合中級教學水平。它旨在為大多數本科經濟學課程中提供的高年級博弈論課程設計，同時也適合尋求對該理論有扎實且易讀介紹的經濟學、政治學、法律和商業研究生。本書可以作為具有重要博弈論成分的研究生課程的主要或次要參考資料。

作者簡介

Joel Watson
任職：University of California, San Diego

作者簡介(中文翻譯)

喬爾·沃森

任職：加州大學聖地牙哥分校

目錄大綱

Ch 1 Introduction

PART I: REPRESENTATIONS AND BASIC ASSUMPTIONS
Ch 2 The Extensive Form
Ch 3 Strategies and the Normal Form
Ch 4 Beliefs, Mixed Strategies, and Expected Payoffs
Ch 5 General Assumptions and Methodology

PART II: ANALYZING BEHAVIOR IN STATIC SETTINGS
Ch 6 Dominance and Best Response
Ch 7 Rationalizability and Iterated Dominance
Ch 8 Location, Partnership, and Social Unrest
Ch 9 Nash Equilibrium
Ch10 Oligopoly, Tariffs, Crime, and Voting
Ch11 Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium
Ch12 Strictly Competitive Games and Security Strategies
Ch13 Contract, Law, and Enforcement in Static Settings

Part III: ANALYZING BEHAVIOR IN DYNAMIC SETTINGS
Ch14 Details of the Extensive Form
Ch15 Sequential Rationality and Subgame Perfection
Ch16 Topics in Industrial Organization
Ch17 Parlor Games
Ch18 Bargaining Problems
Ch19 Analysis of Simple Bargaining Games
Ch20 Games with Joint Decisions; Negotiation Equilibrium
Ch21 Unverifiable Investment, Hold Up, Options, And Ownership
Ch22 Repeated Games and Reputation
Ch23 Collusion, Trade Agreements, and Goodwill

PART IV: INFORMATION
Ch24 Random Events and Incomplete Information
Ch25 Risk and Incentives in Contracting
Ch26 Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and Rationalizability
Ch27 Lemons, Auctions, and Information Aggregation
Ch28 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Ch29 Job-Market Signaling and Reputation

目錄大綱(中文翻譯)

Ch 1 Introduction



PART I: REPRESENTATIONS AND BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

Ch 2 The Extensive Form

Ch 3 Strategies and the Normal Form

Ch 4 Beliefs, Mixed Strategies, and Expected Payoffs

Ch 5 General Assumptions and Methodology



PART II: ANALYZING BEHAVIOR IN STATIC SETTINGS

Ch 6 Dominance and Best Response

Ch 7 Rationalizability and Iterated Dominance

Ch 8 Location, Partnership, and Social Unrest

Ch 9 Nash Equilibrium

Ch10 Oligopoly, Tariffs, Crime, and Voting

Ch11 Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium

Ch12 Strictly Competitive Games and Security Strategies

Ch13 Contract, Law, and Enforcement in Static Settings



Part III: ANALYZING BEHAVIOR IN DYNAMIC SETTINGS

Ch14 Details of the Extensive Form

Ch15 Sequential Rationality and Subgame Perfection

Ch16 Topics in Industrial Organization

Ch17 Parlor Games

Ch18 Bargaining Problems

Ch19 Analysis of Simple Bargaining Games

Ch20 Games with Joint Decisions; Negotiation Equilibrium

Ch21 Unverifiable Investment, Hold Up, Options, And Ownership

Ch22 Repeated Games and Reputation

Ch23 Collusion, Trade Agreements, and Goodwill



PART IV: INFORMATION

Ch24 Random Events and Incomplete Information

Ch25 Risk and Incentives in Contracting

Ch26 Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and Rationalizability

Ch27 Lemons, Auctions, and Information Aggregation

Ch28 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium

Ch29 Job-Market Signaling and Reputation

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