Games to Play and Games Not to Play: Strategic Decisions Via Extensions of Game Theory
Weiss, Uri, Agassi, Joseph
- 出版商: Springer
- 出版日期: 2024-05-19
- 售價: $6,950
- 貴賓價: 9.5 折 $6,603
- 語言: 英文
- 頁數: 236
- 裝訂: Quality Paper - also called trade paper
- ISBN: 3031276035
- ISBN-13: 9783031276033
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商品描述
This book contributes to the theoretical discussions of equilibria that rest on error―in which we include mistaken choices of games to play. Extant game theory recommends diverse strategies (plans of actions) for various given games, particularly those in Nash equilibria, in which no player benefits from one-sided strategy alteration. The literature also refers to the design of games that fit given goals. This is the mechanism design theory; its function is to serve social planners ignorant of the preferences of the people intended to play them.
Our study of games avoidance adds to game theory the meta-game of choosing what game to play and what game to avoid playing, and that both players and planners can generate. This comprises a shift from the maximalist position that aims to maximize possible profit to the minimalist one that aims at minimizing possible loss. This shift depends on the question, considering the public interest, what set of games is it advisable to encourage? Obviously, it is advisable to encourage playing some groups of games such as trade, as well as to discourage playing other groups of games such as wars. This shift makes the theory much more applicable to social science: usually, choosing what game to play is less practical than choosing what game not to play. This invites legislation and similar incentives; their study should aim at the improvement of their usefulness.
Discussing the possibility of changing both game and strategy renders game theory part-and-parcel of social science. For this mathematical models will not do: it requires a clear distinction between describing options and explaining situations. Explanations may enhance efforts at improvement.
商品描述(中文翻譯)
本書對於基於錯誤的均衡理論討論做出了貢獻,其中包括選擇錯誤的遊戲。現有的博弈論為各種給定的遊戲(尤其是那些在納什均衡中,沒有玩家從單方面策略改變中獲益的遊戲)推薦了多樣的策略(行動計劃)。文獻還提到了設計符合特定目標的遊戲。這就是機制設計理論,其功能是為了服務於對於打算參與其中的人的偏好一無所知的社會規劃者。
我們對於避免遊戲的研究為博弈論增加了選擇玩什麼遊戲和避免玩什麼遊戲的元遊戲,這是玩家和規劃者都可以產生的。這構成了從追求最大利潤的極端立場轉向追求最小損失的極簡立場。這種轉變取決於一個問題,考慮到公眾利益,什麼樣的遊戲組合是值得鼓勵的?顯然,鼓勵玩一些遊戲群體(如貿易)並且不鼓勵玩其他遊戲群體(如戰爭)是明智的。這種轉變使得該理論更適用於社會科學:通常,選擇玩什麼遊戲比選擇不玩什麼遊戲更不切實際。這就需要立法和類似的激勵措施;對它們的研究應該旨在提高它們的實用性。
討論改變遊戲和策略的可能性使得博弈論成為社會科學的一部分。對於這一點,數學模型是不夠的:它需要清楚區分描述選項和解釋情況。解釋可以增強改進的努力。