Countering Cyber Sabotage: Introducing Consequence-Driven, Cyber-Informed Engineering (Cce)
暫譯: 反制網路破壞：引入以後果為導向的網路知識工程 (Cce)
Bochman, Andrew A., Freeman, Sarah
- 出版商: CRC
- 出版日期: 2021-01-20
- 售價: $3,310
- 貴賓價: 9.5 折 $3,145
- 語言: 英文
- 頁數: 276
- 裝訂: Hardcover - also called cloth, retail trade, or trade
- ISBN: 036749115X
- ISBN-13: 9780367491154
海外代購書籍(需單獨結帳)
商品描述
Countering Cyber Sabotage: Introducing Consequence-Driven, Cyber-Informed Engineering (CCE) introduces a new methodology to help critical infrastructure owners, operators and their security practitioners make demonstrable improvements in securing their most important functions and processes.
Current best practice approaches to cyber defense struggle to stop targeted attackers from creating potentially catastrophic results. From a national security perspective, it is not just the damage to the military, the economy, or essential critical infrastructure companies that is a concern. It is the cumulative, downstream effects from potential regional blackouts, military mission kills, transportation stoppages, water delivery or treatment issues, and so on. CCE is a validation that engineering first principles can be applied to the most important cybersecurity challenges and in so doing, protect organizations in ways current approaches do not. The most pressing threat is cyber-enabled sabotage, and CCE begins with the assumption that well-resourced, adaptive adversaries are already in and have been for some time, undetected and perhaps undetectable.
Chapter 1 recaps the current and near-future states of digital technologies in critical infrastructure and the implications of our near-total dependence on them. Chapters 2 and 3 describe the origins of the methodology and set the stage for the more in-depth examination that follows. Chapter 4 describes how to prepare for an engagement, and chapters 5-8 address each of the four phases. The CCE phase chapters take the reader on a more granular walkthrough of the methodology with examples from the field, phase objectives, and the steps to take in each phase. Concluding chapter 9 covers training options and looks towards a future where these concepts are scaled more broadly.
商品描述(中文翻譯)
對抗網路破壞：引入以後果為驅動的網路知識工程 (CCE) 介紹了一種新方法，幫助關鍵基礎設施的擁有者、運營者及其安全從業人員在保護其最重要的功能和流程方面取得可見的改善。
目前的網路防禦最佳實踐方法在阻止針對性攻擊者造成潛在災難性結果方面面臨挑戰。從國家安全的角度來看，關注的不僅是對軍事、經濟或關鍵基礎設施公司的損害。還有潛在的區域性停電、軍事任務失敗、交通停擺、水資源供應或處理問題等累積的後續影響。CCE證明了工程基本原則可以應用於最重要的網路安全挑戰，並以此保護組織，這是目前方法所無法做到的。最迫切的威脅是網路驅動的破壞行為，而CCE的假設是，資源充足且具適應性的對手已經潛伏在內部，並且可能已經存在一段時間，未被發現，甚至可能無法被發現。
第一章回顧了關鍵基礎設施中數位技術的當前狀態和近期未來狀態，以及我們幾乎完全依賴這些技術的影響。第二章和第三章描述了該方法論的起源，並為隨後更深入的探討奠定基礎。第四章描述了如何為參與做準備，第五至第八章則針對四個階段進行討論。CCE階段章節帶領讀者更細緻地了解該方法論，並提供來自現場的範例、階段目標以及每個階段需要採取的步驟。最後的第九章涵蓋了培訓選項，並展望未來這些概念能夠更廣泛地擴展。
作者簡介
Andy Bochman is the Senior Grid Strategist for Idaho National Laboratory's National and Homeland Security directorate. In this role, Mr. Bochman provides strategic guidance on topics at the intersection of grid security and resilience to INL leadership as well as senior US and international government and industry leaders. A frequent speaker, writer, and trainer, Mr. Bochman has provided analysis on electric grid and energy sector infrastructure security actions, standards, and gaps to the Department of Energy, Department of Defense, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC), the Electricity Subsector Coordinating Council (ESCC), and most of the US state utility commissions. Teaming with DOE, NARUC, USAID, and international partners, he has cyber-trained grid operators, and is a cybersecurity subject matter expert listed with the US State Department Speakers Bureau. Mr. Bochman has testifi ed before the US Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee on energy infrastructure cybersecurity issues and before FERC on the security readiness of smart grid cybersecurity standards. He has also held recurring conversations on grid security matters with the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the National Security Council (NSC). Prior to joining INL, he was the Global Energy & Utilities Security Lead at IBM and a Senior Advisor at the Chertoff Group in Washington, DC. Mr. Bochman earned a Bachelor of Science degree from the US Air Force Academy and a Master of Arts degree from the Harvard University Extension School.
Sarah Freeman is an Industrial Control Systems (ICS) cyber security analyst at Idaho National Laboratory (INL), where she provides US government partners and private sector entities with actionable cyber threat intelligence, developing innovative security solutions for the critical infrastructure within the US. At Idaho National Laboratory, Ms. Freeman pursues innovative threat analysis and cyber defense approaches, most recently Consequence driven Cyber-informed Engineering (CCE). As Principle Investigator on a laboratory discretionary research, her current research is focused on new signatures and structured methods for cyber adversary characterization. Following the December 2015 electric grid attacks, Ms. Freeman participated in the DOE-sponsored training for Ukrainian asset owners in May 2016. She has also researched the Ukrainian 2015 and 2016 cyber-attacks and the Trisis/Hatman incident. Ms. Freeman earned a Bachelor of Arts from Grinnell College and a Master's in Security and Intelligence Studies from the University of Pittsburgh.
作者簡介(中文翻譯)
**安迪·博赫曼**（Andy Bochman）是愛達荷國家實驗室（Idaho National Laboratory, INL）國家與國土安全局的高級電網策略師。在這個角色中，博赫曼先生為INL的領導層以及美國和國際政府及行業高層提供有關電網安全和韌性交集主題的戰略指導。作為一位經常發言、寫作和培訓的專家，博赫曼先生向能源部（Department of Energy）、國防部（Department of Defense）、聯邦能源監管委員會（Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, FERC）、北美電力可靠性公司（North American Electric Reliability Corporation, NERC）、國家標準與技術研究所（National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST）、全國公用事業監管委員會協會（National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, NARUC）、電力子行業協調委員會（Electricity Subsector Coordinating Council, ESCC）以及大多數美國州公用事業委員會提供了有關電網和能源部門基礎設施安全行動、標準和缺口的分析。與能源部、NARUC、USAID及國際夥伴合作，他對電網操作員進行了網絡安全培訓，並且是美國國務院演講者名冊上的網絡安全主題專家。博赫曼先生曾在美國參議院能源與自然資源委員會就能源基礎設施的網絡安全問題作證，並在FERC就智慧電網網絡安全標準的安全準備情況作證。他還與參議院情報特別委員會（Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, SSCI）和國家安全委員會（National Security Council, NSC）就電網安全問題進行了定期對話。在加入INL之前，他曾擔任IBM的全球能源與公用事業安全負責人，以及位於華盛頓特區的Chertoff Group的高級顧問。博赫曼先生獲得美國空軍學院的理學士學位，以及哈佛大學延伸學院的文學碩士學位。
**莎拉·弗里曼**（Sarah Freeman）是愛達荷國家實驗室（INL）的一名工業控制系統（Industrial Control Systems, ICS）網絡安全分析師，她為美國政府夥伴和私營部門實體提供可行的網絡威脅情報，並為美國的關鍵基礎設施開發創新的安全解決方案。在愛達荷國家實驗室，弗里曼女士追求創新的威脅分析和網絡防禦方法，最近專注於基於後果的網絡知情工程（Consequence driven Cyber-informed Engineering, CCE）。作為一項實驗室自主研究的首席研究員，她目前的研究集中在網絡對手特徵化的新簽名和結構化方法上。在2015年12月的電網攻擊之後，弗里曼女士於2016年5月參加了能源部贊助的烏克蘭資產擁有者培訓。她還研究了烏克蘭2015年和2016年的網絡攻擊以及Trisis/Hatman事件。弗里曼女士獲得格林內爾學院的文學士學位，以及匹茲堡大學的安全與情報研究碩士學位。
