A Pluralist Theory of Perception
Mehta, Neil
- 出版商: MIT
- 出版日期: 2024-08-06
- 售價: $1,880
- 貴賓價: 9.5 折 $1,786
- 語言: 英文
- 頁數: 358
- 裝訂: Quality Paper - also called trade paper
- ISBN: 0262548283
- ISBN-13: 9780262548281
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商品描述
A new theory of perception that posits that conscious perception consists not of a single kind of awareness, but of two radically different kinds deployed in concert.
Most contemporary theories of perception, including leading forms of representationalism and naive realism, are monistic they assume that to consciously perceive is to deploy only one kind of sensory awareness. In A Pluralist Theory of Perception, Neil Mehta instead argues for pluralism, which says that to consciously perceive is to deploy two very different kinds of sensory awareness in concert. Mehta argues that pluralism can simultaneously explain what is common to all forms of consciousness and what is distinctive about conscious perception. Mehta's preferred version of pluralism, which he calls rich pluralism, says that conscious perception is constituted by successful sensory representation and deep awareness. Successful sensory representation is a representational form of awareness whose targets include particulars. It is found in perceptions, whether conscious or unconscious, but not in hallucinations. By contrast, deep awareness is a nonrepresentational form of sensory awareness whose targets are certain universals--the sensory qualities. Deep awareness constitutes one kind of consciousness, it is common to conscious perceptions and hallucinations, and it reveals part of the essences of its targets. Mehta argues that although rich pluralism appears to be less parsimonious than monism, it is not. All monistic theories that are explanatorily adequate end up being even more complex than rich pluralism. Thus, rich pluralism is the most spartan theory that can shoulder the explanatory load.
Most contemporary theories of perception, including leading forms of representationalism and naive realism, are monistic they assume that to consciously perceive is to deploy only one kind of sensory awareness. In A Pluralist Theory of Perception, Neil Mehta instead argues for pluralism, which says that to consciously perceive is to deploy two very different kinds of sensory awareness in concert. Mehta argues that pluralism can simultaneously explain what is common to all forms of consciousness and what is distinctive about conscious perception. Mehta's preferred version of pluralism, which he calls rich pluralism, says that conscious perception is constituted by successful sensory representation and deep awareness. Successful sensory representation is a representational form of awareness whose targets include particulars. It is found in perceptions, whether conscious or unconscious, but not in hallucinations. By contrast, deep awareness is a nonrepresentational form of sensory awareness whose targets are certain universals--the sensory qualities. Deep awareness constitutes one kind of consciousness, it is common to conscious perceptions and hallucinations, and it reveals part of the essences of its targets. Mehta argues that although rich pluralism appears to be less parsimonious than monism, it is not. All monistic theories that are explanatorily adequate end up being even more complex than rich pluralism. Thus, rich pluralism is the most spartan theory that can shoulder the explanatory load.
商品描述(中文翻譯)
一種新的知覺理論提出,意識知覺並非由單一類型的覺知組成,而是由兩種根本不同的覺知形式協同運作。
當代大多數的知覺理論,包括主要的表徵主義和天真現實主義,都是單一論的,它們假設意識知覺僅僅是運用一種感官覺知。在《多元知覺理論》中,Neil Mehta則主張多元論,認為意識知覺是同時運用兩種截然不同的感官覺知。Mehta主張,多元論能同時解釋所有意識形式的共通性以及意識知覺的獨特性。
Mehta所偏好的多元論版本,他稱之為豐富多元論,認為意識知覺是由成功的感官表徵和深層覺知構成。成功的感官表徵是一種表徵形式的覺知,其目標包括具體事物。它存在於意識或無意識的知覺中,但不會出現在幻覺中。相對而言,深層覺知是一種非表徵形式的感官覺知,其目標是某些普遍性——感官特質。深層覺知構成了一種意識,它在意識知覺和幻覺中是共通的,並揭示了其目標的一部分本質。Mehta主張,儘管豐富多元論看起來比單一論更不簡約,但事實上並非如此。所有解釋上足夠的單一論理論最終都會比豐富多元論更為複雜。因此,豐富多元論是能夠承擔解釋負擔的最簡約理論。
作者簡介
Neil Mehta is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Yale-NUS College.
作者簡介(中文翻譯)
尼爾·梅塔是耶魯-國立大學學院的哲學副教授。