Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy: Analysis and Evidence (Paperback)
暫譯: 民主憲法設計與公共政策:分析與證據 (平裝本)
Roger D. Congleton , Birgitta Swedenborg
- 出版商: MIT
- 出版日期: 2006-05-26
- 定價: $1,150
- 售價: 6.0 折 $690
- 語言: 英文
- 頁數: 408
- ISBN: 0262532808
- ISBN-13: 9780262532808
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商品描述
The variety of constitutional designs found in democratic governments has important effects on policy choices and outcomes. That is the conclusion reached in Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy, in which the constitutional procedures and constraints through which laws and public policies are adopted--election laws, the general architecture of government, the legal system, and methods for amendment and reform--are evaluated for their political and economic effects. Leading scholars, many of them pioneers in the new field of constitutional political economy, survey and extend recent empirical evidence on the policy effects of different constitutional procedures and restraints. Their findings are relevant not only to such dramatic changes as democratic transition throughout the world and the development of a European constitution but also to the continuing process of constitutional reform in established democracies. Using the tools of rational choice analysis, the contributors approach the question of constitutional design from public choice, new institutionalist, and new political economy perspectives. Drawing on empirical evidence largely from the OECD countries, the book analyzes such issues as the policy effects of direct (as opposed to representative) democracy, democratic accountability in presidential as compared to parliamentary government, bicameralism and its relation to stable policies, the relative effectiveness of centralized and decentralized governments, the civil and legal regulatory system as a nation's economic constitution, and the link between constitutional stability and the amendment process.
Contributors
John C. Bradbury, Roger D. Congleton, W. Mark Crain, Daniel Diermeier, Lars Feld, Bruno Frey, James D. Gwartney, Randall Holcombe, H lya Eraslan, Brian Knight, Robert A. Lawson Antonio Merlo, Dennis Mueller, Torsten Persson, Bj rn Erik Rasch, Thomas Stratmann, Alois Stutzer, Birgitta Swedenborg, Guido Tabellini, Stefan Voigt, Barry Weingast
商品描述(中文翻譯)
民主政府中存在的各種憲法設計對政策選擇和結果有重要影響。這是《民主憲法設計與公共政策》一書所達成的結論,該書評估了通過哪些憲法程序和限制來採納法律和公共政策——選舉法、政府的一般架構、法律系統以及修訂和改革的方法——對政治和經濟的影響。許多學者,許多是憲法政治經濟學新領域的先驅,調查並擴展了有關不同憲法程序和限制的政策影響的最新實證證據。他們的研究結果不僅與全球民主轉型等劇烈變化以及歐洲憲法的發展相關,還與已建立民主國家的憲法改革持續過程相關。貢獻者們利用理性選擇分析的工具,從公共選擇、新制度主義和新政治經濟學的角度探討憲法設計的問題。該書主要基於經濟合作與發展組織(OECD)國家的實證證據,分析了直接(相對於代議制)民主的政策影響、總統制與議會制政府中的民主問責、兩院制及其與穩定政策的關係、集中與分散政府的相對有效性、作為國家經濟憲法的民事和法律監管系統,以及憲法穩定性與修訂過程之間的聯繫。
貢獻者
John C. Bradbury, Roger D. Congleton, W. Mark Crain, Daniel Diermeier, Lars Feld, Bruno Frey, James D. Gwartney, Randall Holcombe, H lya Eraslan, Brian Knight, Robert A. Lawson, Antonio Merlo, Dennis Mueller, Torsten Persson, Bj rn Erik Rasch, Thomas Stratmann, Alois Stutzer, Birgitta Swedenborg, Guido Tabellini, Stefan Voigt, Barry Weingast